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Abstract
In Chapter  3 of True Enough, Elgin (2017) outlines her view of objectual under-
standing, focusing largely on its non-factive nature and the extent to which a certain 
kind of know-how is required for the “grasping” component of understanding. I will 
explore four central issues that feature in this chapter, concentrating on (1) the role 
of know-how, (2) the concept of endorsement, (3) Elgin’s critique of the factivity 
constraint on understanding, and (4) how we might use aspects of Elgin’s framework 
to inform related debates on the norm of assertion.
Keywords Elgin · Knowledge · Understanding · Know-how · Assertion
1 Introduction
True Enough is a rich, stimulating book, in which one of Elgin’s central concerns 
is to argue that epistemologists should focus on understanding rather than knowl-
edge—especially objectual understanding (i.e., understanding of a subject matter). 
She thinks that this is necessary in order to “accommodate the fruits of science and 
other systematic inquiry” (2017, p. 3), and we have good reasons to endorse Elgin’s 
general suggestion of shifting focus towards understanding. One such reason is 
that understanding plausibly has an epistemic value that (propositional) knowledge 
lacks—for example, Pritchard (2012) and others (e.g., Greco 2010; Riggs 2008) 
claim that understanding, rather than propositional knowledge, is an achievement, 
a kind of success that is primarily creditable to ability. That said, there are some 
details of Elgin’s discussion of that I believe require further development, and it is 
these rather than the points of agreement that will be the central focus.
For the purposes of this paper, my focus will be on Chapter 3, “From Knowledge 
to Understanding”, which is perhaps the most interesting chapter from the point of 
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view of mainstream epistemology (other chapters will be of special interest to, along 
with epistemologists, philosophers of science). In this chapter, Elgin begins to out-
line her account of understanding and explores the distinction between knowledge 
and understanding, in part by considering the sense in which understanding requires 
a grasping component (which, she thinks, requires a certain type of know-how 
which is not reducible to know-that). Crucially, Elgin also argues that understanding 
is, while not “indifferent to the facts”, nevertheless non-factive—that one can under-
stand even if one’s account does not “consist exclusively or predominantly of truths” 
(2017, p. 33).
I will explore three central and interrelated issues about the nature of understand-
ing that feature in this chapter and conclude by suggesting a novel application of the 
view. These concern (1) the role of know-how in Elgin’s account of understanding 
and her treatment of Ryle’s (1949) account of know-how (Sect. 2); (2) the role of 
endorsement in her account of understanding (Sect. 3); how to make a factivity con-
straint on understanding more plausible, and how doing so might influence Elgin’s 
critique of factivity more broadly (Sect. 4); finally, Sect. 5 suggests a way to extend 
parts of Elgin’s framework in order to advance debates about the norm of assertion.
2  Know‑how
There is much to recommend Elgin’s view that understanding essentially involves 
know-how. In addition, for present purposes I will accept Elgin’s more general view 
that know-how is fundamentally dispositional [rather than propositional, as intellec-
tualists like Stanley and Williamson (2001) maintain1]. Accordingly then, Elgin’s 
view that understanding essentially involves know-how is best understood as a view 
that understanding involves a certain kind of disposition or dispositions—a position 
that already differentiates her proposal from reductivism about understanding, pro-
ponents of which hold that understanding simply reduces to propositional knowl-
edge (e.g., Sliwa 2015; Kelp 2015, 2017)
The idea that understanding involves know-how, understood as a disposition, is 
not new; Hills (2009) for example advances this kind of proposal specifically in the 
case of understanding-why, and Duncan Pritchard in places comes close to holding 
such a view (e.g. 2016). Interestingly, though, Elgin is careful to distinguish between 
two ways in which we might theorize about understanding in terms of know-how, 
within the camp of those who reject that know-how is propositional (and accept that 
it is dispositional).
On the one hand, we might think that the kind of know-how that features in 
understanding is essentially dispositional, viz., that the relevant know-how just is 
some suitably specified disposition. For ease of reference, call this view strong dis-
positionalism. This is the view of know-how that Elgin attributes to Gilbert Ryle. 
1 According to Stanley and Williamson (2001), and more recently Stanley (2011), one knows how to do 
something X if and only if (roughly) there is a way for one to X, w, and one knows that w is a way for 
one to X. The alternative that Elgin refers to as dispositionalism owes initially to Ryle (1945, 1949).
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Strong dispositionalism can be distinguished from weak dispositionalism—the 
denial of the view that know-how just is propositional knowledge, in conjunction 
with the claim that possessing know-how in some sense involves disposition.
In challenging the kind of strong dispositionalism she attributes to Ryle, Elgin 
writes:
Knowing-how is not a mere multi-track disposition. Knowing how is an 
achievement. It involves a capacity to do something well, or rightly, or cor-
rectly. An adequate explanation should do justice to this normative character 
[…] What’s missing from Ryle’s account is the normative element (2017, p. 
48).
This passage is an interesting one, and if Elgin’s right, then her line of reasoning 
here has implications not only for how we might think of understanding in terms of 
know-how, but also for the vexed issue of how we should best articulate the dispo-
sitionalist (alternatively, ‘anti-intellectualist’) alternative to propositionalism within 
the theory of know-how.
Let’s focus first on Elgin’s observation that know-how is an achievement, viz., 
minimally, a kind of creditable success.2 Prima facie, it seems that Elgin is quite 
right that knowing how is an achievement. That said, there is a sense (I’ll shortly 
clarify) in which the Rylean view that knowledge-how is a disposition (i.e., an abil-
ity) could potentially accommodate this point. And if that’s right, then the observa-
tion that know-how is an achievement needn’t lead us to part ways with Ryle’s iden-
tification of know-how with a certain kind of disposition.
Here it will be helpful to take as a starting point Bengson and Moffett’s (2011) 
point that any account of know how should distinguish between two different ways 
know-how relates to intelligent action, by:
1. Being in a state of knowing how; e.g., as when one knows how to do a triple lutz 
jump, while one is lying comfortably in bed. Here, the know-how is not mani-
fested in action, even if one has all the right dispositions to do so if one tried.
2. Exercising knowing-how; as when one manifests one’s state of know how in 
action, i.e., as when one skilfully performs a triple lutz.
Knowing-how in the second sense is surely an achievement (for example, a triple 
lutz that manifests a skater’s know-how is an achievement even if simply making all 
the moves of the triple lutz by guesswork and luck is not); and this is because know-
ing how in the second sense is a kind of success because of ability. However, it’s less 
initially obvious that merely being in a state of knowing how is an achievement.3 It 
may be—perhaps being in that state (whereby one has the relevant disposition) is 
2 For a highly influential account of achievement in mainstream epistemology, see Greco (2010). On 
Greco’s view, achievements are essentially successes because of ability. See, however, Bradford (2015) 
for a more demanding account of achievement, according to which achievements involve difficulty and/or 
the overcoming of obstacles.
3 For a defence of the view that know-how is a cognitive achievement, see Carter and Pritchard (2015).
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itself a success because of other abilities4—but the most natural sense to grant that 
know-how is an achievement is in the second sense—exercising know-how. That’s 
where the intuition is surely strongest.
With the foregoing points in mind, the proponent of a Rylean strong disposition-
alist view of know-how (on which know-how = multi-track dispositions) can at this 
point respond along the following lines: (1) know-how is an achievement, granted, 
when one manifests one’s know-how in action. (2) But since it’s less obvious that 
merely being in a state of know how is an achievement than that manifesting know-
how is an achievement, it’s no obvious problem for strong dispositionalism that what 
the view identities with being in a state of know how involves isn’t an achievement. 
(3) Therefore, and contrary to Elgin’s suggestion, the observation that knowledge-
how is an achievement shouldn’t itself lead us to have to part ways with the standard 
Rylean account of know-how as a disposition.
There is, though, a second line of reply available to the Rylean against Elgin’s 
argument from achievement against strong dispositionalism. The second line of 
reply takes issue with what Elgin takes to be a problematic implication for strong 
dispositionalism of the insight that know-how is an achievement—viz., the implica-
tion that know-how involves a kind of normativity that strong dispositionalism can’t 
account for. What I want to now suggest is that there is scope to make sense of the 
normativity of know-how if you are a strong dispositionalist who says that (being in 
a state of) knowing how just is possessing a disposition.
Such a strategy would proceed as follows.5 Firstly, the strong dispositional-
ist could identify know-how with a specific kind of disposition: what Sosa calls a 
competence (e.g., 2010, 2015, 2017). Secondly, they could insist that because com-
petences are essentially normative, it follows that even if the view that know-how 
involves achievement preserves the datum that know-how is normative, so likewise 
does at least one way of defending the strong dispositionalist’s identification of 
know-how with dispositions.
Why are competences essentially normative? The answer can be appreciated by 
considering two kinds of dispositions to succeed at doing something when one tries. 
Suppose that (due to many strangely spent hours practicing in Antarctica) I am dis-
posed to keep the car on the road perfectly whenever—and only when—I drive on a 
solid block of ice; however, whenever I drive on a normal (i.e., dry) road, I am dis-
posed to swerve dangerously. Do I have what we’d normally recognize as a compe-
tence to drive a car, even though I can’t drive successfully on normal roads, simply 
because I can drive successfully on slick roads? On Sosa’s view, I do not. And this 
is because what counts as the competence to drive a car is defined as a disposition to 
succeed reliably enough not just any old way, but when in proper shape and prop-
erly situated.
5 Variations on this strategy have been suggested by Lowenstein (2017), and separately, by Carter and 
Navarro (2017).
4 For example, we might imagine that when one is in the state of knowing how to count cards in a game 
of blackjack, the being in this state is a success even if one doesn’t go on to count cards, simply because 
one reached this state (i.e., a success) through the exercise of abilities (e.g., the abilities to do the relevant 
maths, which one employed when learning to count cards).
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What makes the competence to drive a car a disposition to do so on legal roads 
and such, rather than on a block of ice, is that those conditions (and not the block 
of ice conditions) are the conditions that society values good performance in (Sosa 
2017). It is in this respect that competences are essentially normative. And so if 
being in a state of know-how was just a matter of possessing a Sosa-style compe-
tence, then it would not be devoid of normativity. Here is not the place to attempt to 
defend this proposal further; rather, the claim is (more weakly) the following: if as 
Elgin tells us, understanding essentially involves know-how, then it’s not ultimately 
clear why the kind of know-how understanding involves couldn’t be unpacked just 
as Ryle has unpacked it. At least, the considerations Elgin appeals to about achieve-
ment and normativity aren’t under closer inspection decisive reasons to part ways 
with Ryle.
At this point it is worth registering an important sense in which the kind of Sosa-
style unpacking of Ryle’s view not only avoids the normativity-based objection that 
Elgin takes Ryle’s view to face, but that it actually better explains know-how’s nor-
mativity than her own explanation does. On Elgin’s view, the normativity of know-
how is importantly tied to rule following. As she puts it, ‘much know-how seems to 
be a matter of following the rules of a practice. And it is plausible that the know-
how required for epistemic acceptance is practice based’ (2017, p. 49). Quite rightly, 
Elgin rejects the idea that this rule following requires that one ‘intentionally regulate 
one’s behavior by reference to the rule’ (ibid. 49). However, she also rejects any 
extreme alternative according to which know-how amounts to blind rule following, 
in the sense of ‘automatically, unthinkingly behaving in accord with the norms of 
a practice’ (ibid. 50). In an effort to find a middle ground between these extremes, 
Elgin opts for the following idea: that the normativity of know-how is a matter of 
one’s acting on account of a rule as opposed to merely acting in accordance with a 
rule. In order to illustrate this difference, she offers the following case:
RED LIGHT: Except in New York City, drivers in the United States are per-
mitted to turn right at a red light unless a sign saying ‘No Turn on Red’ is 
posted at the intersection. In New York City, right turns on red are never 
permitted. Drivers from out of town tend to be unaware that New York is an 
exception to the general rule. Suppose Meg, a denizen of a small town in Kan-
sas, is driving in New York. Unsurprisingly, she finds the experience harrow-
ing. She stops at every red light, not because she is aware of or sensitive to 
the law, but because she considers New York drivers and pedestrians reckless 
and wildly unpredictable. She deems it safer to proceed only when the light is 
green. She acts in accord with the law, but not on account of it. The regularity 
in her behavior is not an instance of following the traffic law. Although it may 
be an instance of knowing how to drive safely, it is not an instance of know-
ing how to obey New York traffic laws. Acting in accord with the law is not 
the same as acting on account of the law (see Kant 1981). And only acting on 
account of the law qualifies as knowing how (ibid. 50).
If exercising know-how is a matter of acting not merely in accord with some 
rule or standard, but acting on account of that standard, then exercising know-how 
involves neither intentional rule following (which is implausible, given that often 
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know-how is manifested second-nature) nor blind or accidental rule-following. And 
this looks to be a pleasing outcome.
The fly in the ointment, however—and here is the fundamental problem with 
locating the normativity of know-how in rule following of any kind—concerns the 
kind of know-how that is exhibited in cases of expertise. Consider, in particular, 
cases of expertise that involve novelties—e.g., performances that create new stand-
ards of success as opposed to conforming to existing success standards. A famous 
example of such a novelty involves Ulrich Salchow, a Swedish figure skater who in 
1909 became the first to attempt a rotating jump (later termed, a ‘Salchow’ in a skat-
ing competition. Prior to 1909, the success standards in skating were formulated in 
a way that did not include reference to rotating jumps. After 1909, such jumps were 
commonplace and expected at top-level competition.
With reference to the Salchow case, it is plausible that Salchow manifested his 
skating know-how in performing his jump for the very first time, and more gener-
ally, that skilful novelties are know-how manifestations. This datum is looks very 
difficult to explain on the view that know how essentially involves performance on 
account of rules or success standards. In a case like Salchow, the jump was excep-
tional despite its deviation from normal standards of successful skating.
The kind of Sosa-style gloss on a simple Rylean account of know-how, by not 
locating the normativity of know-how in rule-following, avoids this problem. By 
way of reminder, on such a view, the normativity of know-how is explained not with 
reference to norm following; rather, the idea is that what counts as know-how apt 
abilities is itself explained by reference to performance conditions that are of value 
to us. Novelties are valuable performances (imagine cheers for Salchow’s first jump) 
despite the fact that they are not performed on account of extant and accepted rules. 
Such cases accordingly seem to be better accounted for on the proposal offered than 
on the view Elgin has recommended.
3  The endorsement thesis
I want to turn now to some questions that I think are worth considering in connec-
tion with Elgin’s view that understanding involves such attitudes as endorsement 
and commitment. For example, she writes “Understanding is an epistemic commit-
ment to a comprehensive, systematically linked body of information …” (2017, p. 
44). Elsewhere, she says “Understanding on my view is a (perhaps tacit) endorse-
ment …” (2017, p. 45). For ease of reference, let’s refer to this general idea as the 
endorsement thesis:
Endorsement Thesis: If a subject S understands a topic F, and S’s understand-
ing is constituted by the body of information X, then S epistemically endorses 
X.
Including in one’s account of understanding something like Elgin’s Endorse-
ment Thesis offers an elegant way to get the right result in cases that look other-
wise very much like understanding but where such endorsement is lacking. It will 
be helpful at this point to consider an analogy with knowledge and imagination. 
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Suppose I imagine that the suspect is guilty—I picture this in my mind, by visu-
alising the suspect committing the crime. Suppose further that I have evidence for 
thinking this true, but for whatever reason, I in no way commit myself epistemi-
cally, by belief or otherwise, to the proposition that the suspect is guilty; I simply 
imagine this in the absence of any such a commitment, as I might when taking 
myself to engage with fiction. In such a case, I surely don’t know that the suspect 
is guilty (regardless of whether the suspect really is guilty); from my own point of 
view, I’ve merely engaged in ‘make believe’.
Something similar surely goes for understanding. Just suppose that [to use a 
variation on a case by Riggs (2009)] you are confused by your friend’s aquapho-
bia; you know your friend is very afraid of water, but you don’t understand his 
fear of water. Suppose that, feeling uncomfortable with this confusion, you con-
coct an imaginative story about your friend’s history and relationship with water, 
according to which the friend’s parents had harshly punished the child for some-
thing while they were near water. Suppose further that you (in the sense Elgin 
demands) know how the relevant explanations between the various bits of this 
story you’ve concocted fit together and furthermore know how to draw relevant 
inferences from this imaginative and perfectly coherent picture you’ve concocted.
Let’s now add to the story. Suppose you then come to gain evidence for think-
ing that things with your friend and his acquiring a fear a water happened just as 
you imagined they did. You might now understand your friend’s aquaphobia. But, 
as the Endorsement Thesis seems to rightly imply, you did not count as under-
standing your friend’s fear of water prior to having the kind of commitment or 
endorsement of the bits of the story you acquire later, viz., back when you lacked 
any such endorsement, having concocted the story through imagination.
Although cases like the aquaphobia case speak in favour of the Endorsement 
Thesis, there are however other cases where understanding is plausibly present 
even though there’s a sense in which the relevant body of information is in no 
way endorsed or committed to (in fact, even when it is explicitly rejected).
To sharpen this point, it will be useful to take as a reference point a kind of 
‘understanding twist’ on Jennifer Lackey’s much-discussed ‘Creationist Teacher’ 
case (2008, p. 48).
CREATIONIST TEACHER (understanding variant) (CT-U): Stella is 
a devoutly Christian university professor, and her religious beliefs are 
grounded in a deep faith that she has had since she was a very young child. 
Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of creationism and, accord-
ingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, she fully 
recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific evidence 
against both of these beliefs. Stella, in fact, reads contemporary scientific 
journals and regularly teaches advanced graduate seminars on evolution, 
where students and colleagues alike admire the deep appreciation Stella has 
of how the theory holds together. Moreover, Stella readily admits that she 
is not basing her own commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, 
rather, on the personal faith that she has in an all-powerful Creator.
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In CT-U, there’s a clear sense in which Stella does not endorse evolution; she does 
not believe the propositions that purport to characterise evolution—she positively 
thinks they are false. Moreover, Stella in CT-U is not epistemically committed to the 
view in so far as it is straightforwardly at odds with her creationist beliefs. That said, 
however, it is not obvious that Stella doesn’t understand evolution.6 Though neither 
Stella nor our protagonist in the aquaphobia case satisfy the Endorsement Thesis’s 
constraint, Stella is very much unlike the subject in the aquaphobia case prior to 
gaining the evidence she does. Crucially, Stella is engaging in more than mere fic-
tion, from her own perspective, despite her explicitly disavowing by regarding as 
false the body of information characterising the evolutionary process. In this respect, 
then, it looks like Elgin’s Endorsement Thesis is going to struggle with a certain 
class of case, which indicates the condition is too strong as stated as a condition on 
understanding.
One interesting, though I think ultimately unsuccessful, thread of resistance to 
this concern draws from Elgin’s remarks on belief, conviction and acceptance (ibid. 
19). Elgin writes that:
[t]he term ‘belief’ is ubiquitous in epistemology. To avoid (or at least mini-
mize) confusion, I will use the term ‘conviction’ for what Cohen calls ‘belief’. 
To be convinced that p is to be disposed, when attending to issues raised or 
items referred to by p, normally to feel that it is true that p and false that ~ p. 
To accept that p involves being willing to take p as a premise, as a basis for 
action or, I add, as an epistemic norm or a rule of inference, when one’s ends 
are cognitive. This includes being willing to give others to accept that p via 
testimony. Acceptance is not a disposition to represent, but a disposition to act 
(ibid. 19).
With reference to this distinction, it might be argued that Stella does endorse evo-
lution in virtue of her acceptance, rather than in virtue of her belief. This suggestion 
sounds initially reasonable, though it is on closer inspection not clearly available to 
Elgin. To bring this point out, compare Stella with a non-creationist science teacher. 
The non-creationist science teacher not only (in Elgin’s terms) is convinced by evo-
lutionary theory, but they also accept it in the sense that they have the relevant dis-
position to act in accordance with the theory. Stella differs from the non-creationist 
science teacher in an important respect: her disposition to act is extremely contex-
tually sensitive. We are to assume it is only in the classroom that the disposition 
manifests. We have no reason to suppose Stella continues to act as if the evolution 
is correct elsewhere—but rather, given her creationist convictions—the natural way 
of reading the case is one on which she’ll act as if it’s false the rest of the time.7 
7 Granted, even so, Stella acts as if evolution were true to a greater extent than someone who, say, never 
manifested this disposition, in the classroom or otherwise. This is the case simply because, for Stella, 
there is a context in which she acts as if it is true. Does this give us reason to think that Stella thereby 
accepts evolution in virtue of having a disposition (even if highly context-sensitive) to act as if it were 
true? Here I think an analogy to dispositions to believe will be helpful. We aren’t inclined to attribution 
to someone, S, a disposition to believe X even if there are some very specific contexts in which S would 
believe S. For example, suppose someone is inclined to believe their mother loves them only when talk-
6 See, however, [REDACTED] for a different kind of diagnosis of this case.
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Making this feature of the case salient casts doubt on the thought that Stella clearly 
satisfies the Endorsement Thesis even on a weakened version of it which trades on 
acceptance rather than belief.
An additional strategy for responding to the above thread of argument proceeds 
along the following lines: perhaps Stella’s understanding is just of the doctrine of 
evolutionary theory but not of the “phenomena that the doctrine purports to be 
about” (e.g., as one who disbelieves astrology might understand that doctrine but 
not understand the phenomena it purports to be about, i.e., celestial causation).8 But 
even if we grant that Stella understands the doctrine in the way that one might under-
stand a theory that’s ‘untethered’ entirely from reality (like astrology), might not 
Stella be in a better position here? After all, her ‘grasp’ or tether here seems to be a 
well-founded one. It’s not entirely clear from Elgin’s own discussion of endorsement 
how a refinement of the Endorsement Thesis might work in order to address CT-U 
style cases, but it seems that some kind of refinement will ultimately be needed.
4  Understanding, factivity and centrality
In this section, I want to focus on the non-factivity component of Elgin’s account of 
understanding, particularly by considering in some detail the kind of motivation one 
might have for moving away from (a plausibly stated version of) the more standard 
factive proposal, such as that defended by Kvanvig (2003) and which Elgin rejects.
It should be uncontroversial that one can understand a subject matter even if some 
of one’s beliefs about that subject matter are false. In this sense, a ‘super’ factive 
conception of understanding is too restrictive. What’s at issue between factive and 
non-factive proposals is accordingly not whether understanding tolerates some false 
beliefs, but rather, to what extent understanding tolerates false beliefs.
Elgin takes her opponent to be moderate factive accounts, viz., those with a for-
mulated factivity constraint on understanding that applies only to some set of ‘cen-
tral’ beliefs. A familiar way of capturing this idea, due to Kvanvig (2003), is that 
understanding a subject matter φ requires true central φ-beliefs but is compatible 
with false peripheral φ-beliefs. Alternatively: a subject S can have objectual under-
standing of subject matter φ only if amongst S’s central φ beliefs there are no false 
beliefs.
Of course, restricting a factivity condition on understanding to central beliefs 
within a body of information is only going to be plausible if centrality can be artic-
ulated in a way that marks some meaningful difference between central and non-
central beliefs. If factive views cannot achieve this, then this is a serious theoretical 
8 Compare with Elgin (2017, p. 45).
ing to their therapist. The intuition here would be to withhold attributing a flat-out disposition to believe. 
And, by parity of reasoning, a similar diagnosis looks plausible in the case of Stella. Neither Stella, nor 
our therapy subject, manifests the relevant disposition in normal conditions. Thanks to a referee at Syn-
these for suggesting development of this line of thinking.
Footnote 7 (continued)
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mark against such proposals (in contrast with non-factive accounts, which needn’t 
make any such distinction).
In what follows, I want to do two main things in this section; first, I want to sketch 
how centrality might be best unpacked within a factive model of understanding, and 
in such a way as to save factive proposals from the style of objection just canvased; 
and then, I’ll conclude the section by considering a separate and I think fruitful 
application of the notion of centrality (refined in the context of factive proposals) to 
Elgin’s own non-factive view.
4.1  Centrality and factivity
On what basis should propositions count as ‘central’ to a subject matter (such that, 
if believed falsely, they will be capable of undermining what would otherwise count 
as understanding)? Just how, exactly, are central beliefs to be distinguished from 
peripheral beliefs, vis-à-vis some body of information? Unfortunately, factive views 
such as Kvanvig’s have had little to say on this, relying mostly on aphorism and 
analogy.
Perhaps we can start by taking a cue here from Elgin herself, noting that a sig-
nificant part of what we can do with understanding involves being able to (1) make 
predictions and (2) manipulate information based on that understanding.9 To a first 
approximation, then, we might try to answer the question of whether a belief is cen-
tral or not by asking whether (or how much) that belief matters with respect to our 
ability to make predictions and manipulation information—viz., with what we do 
with understanding.
This idea—as a working insight—comports well with the idea that some beliefs 
don’t matter much in this respect. For example, believing falsely that the Socialist 
realism art movement in Russia began in 1931 rather than 1932 would not signifi-
cantly undermine your reliability when making predictions or manipulating infor-
mation with respect to the subject matter of modern Russian history. If—as the cur-
rent working idea goes—a belief’s being central is a matter of how much having 
(or not having) that belief would affect your reliability in predicting/manipulating 
information on the subject matter, then such a belief isn’t central to your understand-
ing of modern Russian history. And so, a plausibly formulated factive account of 
understanding—one that says that one can’t have false central beliefs—could with 
reference to this explanation say in a principled way why understanding is compat-
ible with beliefs like this one.
By contrast to the previous case, believing some things falsely (within a given 
subject matter) actually would plausibly significantly undermine your reliability 
when making predictions or manipulating information about that subject matter. 
Such beliefs are in this respect practically relevant to your understanding. What 
this all suggests, initially, is that—insofar as we want to say something illuminating 
9 See, e.g., Elgin (2017, p. 44).
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about what makes a belief central, we should do so along the following lines—by 
understanding centrality in terms of practical relevance as follows:
Practical Relevance: S’s belief B is (highly) practically relevant to S’s objec-
tual understanding, φ = Df. S believes B, and were S to believe falsely whether 
B, this would significantly undermine S’s reliability when S makes predictions 
or manipulates information with respect to subject matter φ.
Centrality: S’s belief B is central to S’s objectual understanding, φ = Df. B is 
highly practically relevant to S’s understanding of φ.
Now, if central beliefs are the highly practically relevant beliefs (as per above), 
and if highly practically relevant beliefs are ones that significantly influence what 
one can do with one’s understanding,10 then we might press further and ask: What 
makes a belief capable of having this influence in the first place? What would make 
a given belief (if false) sabotage one’s reliability in prediction and manipulation of 
the subject matter?
Here is a plausible line of thought in response to these questions: All things 
equal, the greater the number of φ-beliefs that directly ‘depend upon’ a given belief 
B for S, the more influence B will have over what S can do (practically speaking) 
with the putative φ-understanding (vis-à-vis prediction/manipulation). Consider, for 
example, the following. Suppose you come to find out that a family member—Abel 
–incarcerated for many years for committing a series of grisly murders—is actually 
innocent (despite having pled guilty and convinced everyone he was). By learning 
this, you’d be inclined to revise or give up a lot of beliefs you previously had about 
Abel, his character, his dispositions, his reasons for doing certain things, etc.
Given that a lot of beliefs you have about Abel depend in this way on your belief 
that he is a murderer (beliefs you would give up upon learning he is not), that 
belief is an influential one within the body of information that forms the (putative) 
10 It is worth noting a caveat to the above account of practical relevance. Suppose, for example, B is 
such that, were S to believe falsely whether B, this would significantly undermine S’s reliability when S 
makes predictions or manipulates information with respect to subject matter φ; but, suppose further that 
the kind of predictions or information manipulations that S happens to be inclined to use φ with respect 
to are highly abnormal, or that they otherwise reflect idiosyncratic desires. For instance, imagine that S’s 
understanding of higher maths is such that S uses such maths only to analyse, predict, and manipulate 
football statistics and for nothing else. One might press that, on the account of centrality framed in terms 
of practical relevance which I’ve offered, it looks as though, implausibly, such epistemically irrelevant 
desires will have an influence on what counts as central to understanding higher maths. One response to 
this point is to simply regard what’s described here as an acceptable kind of pragmatic encroachment on 
understanding. I’m not inclined toward such a diagnosis. An alternative, which I take to be more plausi-
ble, involves further unpacking the condition so that it blocks such encroachment. For instance, we might 
qualify the view as follows: B is practically relevant (in the sense demanded for centrality) if it is such 
that, were S to believe falsely whether B, this would significantly undermine S’s reliability (1) when S 
makes predictions or manipulates information with respect to subject matter φ; (2) were S to make a suit-
ably wide range of predictions or information manipulations with respect to subject matter φ, and regard-
less of whether one does in fact make such predictions, etc. Adding this second clause helps us to deal 
with cases like the football statistics case noted above. Of course, the proposed second clause would need 
to then be supplemented with a plausible formulation of ‘suitably wide class’, e.g., perhaps with refer-
ence to normalcy or safety. Thanks to a referee at Synthese for raising this point.
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understanding you have of Abel. Moreover, being wrong about this particular mat-
ter—viz., his guilt or innocence of the grisly murders—would significantly under-
mine your reliability when making predictions or manipulating information about 
him. Such a belief is thus, on the view suggested, (1) highly practically relevant 
to your understanding of your family member; and (2) therefore, central to that 
understanding.
A proposal along these lines can accommodate some intuitive results. Firstly, the 
centrality of a given belief is positively correlated what we use understanding to 
do. Secondly, it excludes from centrality beliefs that have little import to prediction/
manipulation; and those on which not much depends. Thirdly, it can explain, in a 
broadly similar way to Elgin’s view, the (instrumental) epistemic value of under-
standing in terms of what one can do with it. In these respects, some of the initial 
motivations for moving away from a factive construal of understanding are vitiated.
4.2  Centrality and non‑factivity
The foregoing strategy for unpacking a factive account such as Kvanvig’s has shown 
us how we might flesh out the notion of centrality in order to help us determine 
which beliefs should plausibly qualify as central, and thus capable of undermining 
understanding if they are false. This provides what is perhaps a more charitable con-
struction of the kind of factive proposal Elgin dismisses as implausible, one that also 
retains the spirit of a key aspect of Elgin’s own proposal—specifically, the idea that 
central to understanding is the ability to use the body of information you understand.
That said, the account of centrality suggested in the service of formulating a 
(more charitable) factive view might also be of use to another element of Elgin’s 
own proposal. To see this potential application, consider Elgin’s remark that “We 
now can see that [sic. understanding] involves knowing how to wield the commit-
ments that bear on the topic—how to draw the inferences and perform the actions 
that the understanding licenses” (2017, p. 56).
Presumably we do not want to rule out one as understanding a subject matter 
if one can’t draw out all inferences and perform all actions that the understanding 
licenses. For example, we don’t want to deny understanding to a chemist who knows 
how to draw the inferences and perform the actions that understanding licenses 
except in the case of some particular obscure element, about which the chemist has 
a mental block.
I suggest we might then refine Elgin’s position in the following way: Understand-
ing requires knowing how to draw all the central inferences and perform central 
actions that the understanding licenses—where this will be (something like) those 
inferences and actions such that it matters to whether you can draw many of the 
other inferences and perform other actions the understanding licenses. For example, 
even if the aforementioned chemist’s understanding licenses her to draw inferences 
and perform certain actions about the obscure element, and she is for whatever rea-
son unable to do so due to a mental block, this mental block doesn’t prevent her 
from doing most or all of the other things (i.e., draw inferences, perform actions) her 
understanding licenses. But if the chemist failed to know how to do basic chemical 
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reactions (e.g., how to combine hydrogen and nitrogen in order to produce ammonia 
gas) then this actually would prevent her from knowing how to do many of the things 
that understanding chemistry would license—and so (plausibly) failing to have this 
(central) ability might indicate she really does lack understanding of chemistry.
Thus, there is a possible application of the centrality constraint on factivity pro-
posals that might naturally lend itself to being incorporated into Elgin’s own non-
factivist account—viz., a principled way of unpacking the action component of 
understanding that Elgin explicitly opts for. At this point it is worth asking: is there 
a reason to positively prefer a thoroughly non-factivist proposal (supplemented with 
this action/inference component) to a moderately factive one, which embraces a cen-
trality constraint? The answer would be ‘yes’ if we should accept Elgin’s argument 
from the history of science. This point merits some sustained attention.
The general structure of Elgin’s (e.g., ibid. 58–60) argument goes as follows: (1) 
there are various cases in the history of science where a theory’s central claims were 
strictly false; and yet (2) the proponents of such theories had some understanding of 
the phenomena the theories purport to describe. (3) moderately factive views can’t 
make sense of (1) and (2). Therefore (4) moderately factive views are mistaken.
A notable example Elgin offers concerns the Copernican theory of the cosmos, 
a central claim of which is the contention that the Earth travels around the sun in a 
circular orbit. Given that Copernicus’s view was predicated on absolute space (and 
so doesn’t account for the fact that the sun itself is not located at a fixed point), 
a central claim of the view is, strictly speaking, false (ibid. 60). But, as the idea 
goes, embracing the Copernican model comes with a tremendous intellectual gain; 
by embracing it one leaves the Ptolemaic geocentric model behind and has a signifi-
cantly better understanding than before.
There are two salient ways a factivist has available to respond to such cases. One 
is to simply dismiss attributions of understanding here as ‘honorific’ (ibid. 59–60). 
Such a move is one Elgin considers and I think rightly dismisses. Granted, some 
cases where understanding is lacked are such that honorific attributions are felici-
tous; however, it’s hardly clear that that’s what’s going on here, especially when the 
relevant intellectual gain is pointed out. Put another way, the burden would seem to 
be on the factivist to explain why this particular understanding attribution is merely 
honorific.
But there is a better strategy available to the factivist, one that involves a more 
fine-grained focus on the object of understanding in these cases. To begin, note that 
a moderately factive account implies that Copernicus did not understand the cosmos 
(or perhaps: the earth and sun in relation to the cosmos) in virtue of his false central 
belief. This is I think the right result. Though it hardly reflects poorly on Coperni-
cus. It is widely thought in theoretical physics that approximately 70% of the uni-
verse is made of dark energy which itself is not understood. It is fair to say that no 
one understands the subject matter that is the cosmos. The factivist is not worse off 
for implying Copernicus does not.
What the above suggests is that if Copernicus-style cases are a problem for mod-
erate factivity, then it must be because (despite a false central belief) understanding 
of something more specific than the cosmos simpliciter is present, and that this is 
so despite the presence of a false central belief. Once we think of the problem this 
 Synthese
1 3
way, though, it’s much less clear that the factivist is in any trouble at all. Take, for 
instance, the subject matter that is: earth’s relationship to the sun—setting aside the 
wider cosmos and the sun’s position within it. Despite a false belief about the abso-
lute location of the sun, Copernicus is able to reliably make predictions about this 
relationship that he was unable to make before. What this indicates, interestingly, is 
that a belief one way or the other about the sun’s absolute location in the universe 
(viz., the point on which Copernicus was mistaken) is not central to understanding 
the subject matter that is the relationship between the sun and the earth.
But if that’s right, then the moderate factivist, no less than the non-factivist, has 
the resources available for diagnosing such cases in a plausible way; and, more gen-
erally, we have reason to doubt that cases in the history of science are as troubling to 
a reasonably articulated moderative factivism as Elgin supposes.
5  Norms of assertion
I want to conclude by developing what I take to be a pleasing but unexplored con-
sequence of a central part of Elgin’s view. In particular, I want to show how Elgin’s 
account of the grasping component of understanding in terms of know-how has the 
resources to resolve a standing issue in the contemporary literature on the epistemic 
norms governing assertion.11 I will close by detailing and expanding on what I take 
to be this benefit of her proposal.
The speech act of assertion is widely taken to be governed by some (to be speci-
fied) epistemic norm. For example, if you assert that p, and then it turns out that 
you were guessing or had scant evidence for what you said, it looks as though your 
assertion is defective; it would be appropriate to criticise your assertion in such a 
circumstances. For example: “You shouldn’t have told her the food is microwave-
able—you haven’t even looked at the label” or “You shouldn’t have asserted that 
the client should strike a plea bargain on the basis of having watched a few crime 
dramas on television.”
According to the knowledge account of assertion12 one’s assertion that p is epis-
temically proper if and only if one knows that p. On the necessity leg of this account 
(KNA-N), one’s assertion that p is epistemically proper only if one knows p, and 
on the sufficiency leg (KNA-S), one’s assertion that p is epistemically proper if one 
knows that p. Much of the contemporary criticism to the knowledge account has 
focused on KNA-N (and thus on whether knowledge is necessary for epistemically 
proper assertion, or whether what’s necessary is merely justified belief). However, 
more recently, the sufficiency leg has received its own kind of challenge.
Defenders of the sufficiency leg of the knowledge account include DeRose 
(2002), Simion (2015), Hawthorne (2004) and Matt Benton (2014). If KNA-S 
is right, then whenever one knows what one asserts, then even if one might be 
11 For a representative sample of essays engaged in this debate, see (eds.) Brown and Cappelen (2011).
12 For the seminal presentation of this view, see Williamson (1996).
1 3
Synthese 
criticisable on non-epistemic (e.g., moral) grounds for making the assertion one did, 
the assertion is epistemically beyond reproach.
One case that has been controversial in the recent literature [especially between 
Benton (2016), Simion (2015), Lackey (2011, 2014) and Carter and Gordon (2011, 
2017)] and which appears to raise trouble for KNA-S is the following:
DOCTOR: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has been diag-
nosing and treating various kinds of cancers for the past fifteen years. One of 
her patients, Derek, was recently referred to her office because he has been 
experiencing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. After requesting 
an ultrasound and MRI, the results of the tests arrived on Matilda’s day off; 
consequently, all of the relevant data were reviewed by Nancy, a competent 
medical student in oncology training at her hospital. Being able to confer for 
only a very brief period of time prior to Derek’s appointment today, Nancy 
communicated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, with-
out offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her 
conclusion. Shortly thereafter, Matilda had her appointment with Derek, where 
she truly asserts to him purely on the basis of Nancy’s reliable testimony, “I 
am very sorry to tell you this, but you have pancreatic cancer. (Lackey 2008, 
pp. 3–4)
In the DOCTOR CASE, Matilda surely knows that Derek has cancer. After all, 
she heard this testimony from a known-to-be reliable source, and she lacks any 
undefeated defeaters.13 But, is Matilda properly epistemically positioned to flat out 
assert to Derek that he has pancreatic cancer? Consider, for one thing, that Derek 
would plausibly be displeased to learn that Matilda had diagnosed him without see-
ing his charts or examining him. Derek would reasonably be within his rights to 
expect Matilda to have a better grasp of his situation epistemically than she did.
In previous work (2011), I’ve suggested that what Matilda lacks here specifically 
is a kind of understanding, and that’s why her assertion is (contra KNA-S) epistemi-
cally improper. More specifically, the suggestion was that certain epistemic roles 
a speaker may occupy carry with them expectations of expertise. (e.g., a doctor’s 
diagnosis of a patient; an Olympic judge’s evaluation of a skating performance; a 
risk-assessment professional’s evaluation of the safety of a bridge, etc.)
In such cases, mere isolated (e.g., testimonial) knowledge is not enough, in the 
absence of grasping (in some suitably specified way) the subject matter in question. 
Thus, the suggestion is that understanding in at least some cases is the necessary 
epistemic credential to warrant assertion.
Elgin’s account has the resources to offer a deeper diagnosis for why this would 
be so, and thus a more satisfying reason for rejecting KNA-S. According to Elgin 
(2017), understanding:
13 As the case is described, the hearer condition on testimonial knowledge is going to be satisfied not 
only on non-reductionist proposals but also on reductionist proposals, given that there are positive rea-
sons to think that the speaker is reliable.
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involves knowing how to wield the commitments that bear on the topic—how 
to draw the inferences and perform the actions that the understanding licenses. 
That know-how is, in Rylean terms, a multitrack disposition—an ability and 
propensity to make certain inferences and eschew others, to perform certain 
actions and refrain from others, to engage in and endorse certain forms of 
higher-order evaluation and criticism and avoid and repudiate others (2017, p. 
56, emphasis mine).
With Elgin’s characterisation of these ability-relevant features of understand-
ing in hand—along with some additional plausible premises—the following diag-
nosis of DOCTOR becomes available: In a social community, expertise is sig-
nalled by certain institutional roles, e.g., the institutional role of a medical doctor. 
When one speaks as an occupier of such a role, the hearer is warranted to expect 
that the speaker speaks with the kind of expertise that is associated with the role. 
Such expectations include the expectation that the speaker (qua occupying that role) 
be able not merely to state facts accurately, but to have a propensity to (as Elgin 
says) “make certain inferences, to perform certain actions and refrain from others, 
to engage in and endorse certain forms of evaluation and criticism and avoid and 
repudiate others.” If we discovered that the speaker was unable to do these things on 
the topic at hand (e.g., Matilda in DOCTOR), then regardless of what facts speaker 
knows, that warranted expectation on the part of the hearer is not met, and the asser-
tion is epistemically criticisable. If (per Elgin) understanding essentially involves 
knowing how to do such things, then (in DOCTOR) Matilda’s assertion is criticisa-
ble precisely because she lacked understanding that Derek was warranted in expect-
ing her to have.
In sketching out the above diagnosis, I hope to have shown how Elgin has the 
resources to help bolster the claim that, in certain cases, understanding rather than 
knowledge is what gives us the appropriate epistemic credentials to assert. If this 
is right, this shows a way that Elgin’s account might take us further than others in 
diagnosing where proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion come up short.
6  Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to provide a critical exploration of some of the 
key themes of one of the central chapters in Elgin’s True Enough. In particular, 
I have examined the (1) the role of know-how, (2) the concept of endorsement in 
Elgin’s account of understanding, (3) her critique of the factivity constraint on 
understanding, and (4) how we might use aspects of Elgin’s framework to inform 
related debates about the epistemic norm or norms governing assertion. One 
topic I’ve not engaged with here—as it merits an extended separate discussion—
is Elgin’s ingenuitive account of the role of exemplification in understanding, as 
a way of fleshing out the positive way how understanding can be a non-factive 
cognitive achievement. Even more, Elgin takes care to show how her view has 
rich implications for how we think about aesthetic understanding, including in 
the case of dance. The present focus, while setting aside these interesting features 
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of the overall proposal, has hopefully shown how attention to Elgin’s Chapter 3 
reveals not only some ways to improve Elgin’s own thinking about knowledge and 
understanding, but also some ways in which we might make progress when theo-
rising about this relationship more generally.14
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